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RELIGION: THE PSYCHEDELIC PERSPECTIVE:
THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION DEFENSE
Mark R. Brown
The first amendment to the United States Constitution specifically
provides: "Congress shall make no laws respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof: . .. "
The words following the comma in the quoted passage have come
to be known as the "free exercise clause," and have taken on a
very important role in constitutional law. Originally, the free
exercise clause was intended to secure religious autonomy by
placing matters of religion beyond the realm of the federal gov-
ernment.' Later, the free exercise clause was applied as a
limitation on the states as well.' Today, the free exercise clause
has taken on added significance because it has become the
protector of individuals' religious beliefs and practices.
The free exercise clause has taken an active role in prosecutions
for the use or possession of psychedelic drugs." There are several
religious groups (and many individuals) who profess a belief in
one psychedelic drug or another. Several religious sects believe
that a given psychedelic drug is a sacrament in their religion, akin
to the eucharist in the Catholic faith. Other religious groups
claim that the drug or drugs simply help them to get in touch with
their god. Finally, at least one religious group worships the psy-
chedelic drug itself as actually being a part of its god. No matter
what kind of belief is expressed in the drug, by asserting such
belief those charged with crimes for possession or use of the drug
have attempted to shield themselves under the free exercise
clause. With few exceptions, this defense has proven unsuccess-
ful.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-1 (1978).
3. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Supreme Court incorporated the
first amendment into the fourteenth amendment, thus making it applicable to the states).
4. Psychedelic substances include LSD, DMT, DET, marijuana, peyote, psilocybin,
psilocin, mescaline, and their salts, isomers, esters, and analogs. Native American Church
of New York v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
5. The various religious groups include: the Native American Church; the Neo-
American Church; the Universal Life Church; the Holy American Church; the Aquarian
Brotherhood Church; the Church of the Missionaries of the New Truth; the Moslems; the
Church of the Awakening; Tantric Buddhism; Hinduism; and the Ethiopian Zion Coptic
Church. These religious groups are discussed throughout the text of this article.
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The drugs most often involved in this kind of case are
marijuana, LSD, and peyote. It is important to note the nature
and effect of psychedelic drugs as compared to narcotics,
poisons, and stimulants.6 Psychedelic drugs are distinguishable
from the others in that there is arguably no harmful effect to the
user, which lessens any governmental interest in regulating the
use of such drugs.' Where the drug is of a type that is harmful to
the user himself, the governmental interest in regulation is much
stronger.8 With the onslaught of governmental regulation (state
as well as federal), 9 inevitably more and more cases will arise
involving criminal charges for drug use or possession, along with
the accompanying religious claims.
I. Constitutional Standards
The Supreme Court of the United States has never addressed a
case dealing with both freedom of religion and the use of con-
trolled or dangerous drugs. However, the Supreme Court has
handed down several important decisions concerning religious
freedom. An analysis of these decisions is necessary to under-
stand how other courts have addressed the issue. The Court's in-
terpretation of the free exercise clause has changed over the
years, and for this reason a historical approach is helpful.
Development of Constitutional Standards
One of the earliest and most important decisions concerning
the free exercise of religion was Reynolds v. United States.10 The
Utah Territory had passed a law making polygamy a criminal of-
fense.t" The defendant was charged with violating the statute and
6. See K. JONES, L. SHAINBURG & C. BYER, DRUGS AND ALCOHOL 21-65 (1969).
7. The argument persists that the user himself is dangerous to others, which might
justify government regulation. See Town v. State ex rel. Reno, 377 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1979),
app. dismissed, 449 U.S. 803, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). Compare People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
8. The scope of this article is limited solely to psychedelic drugs. For more informa-
tion concerning other dangerous drugs, see Comment, Brave New World Revisited: Fif-
teen Years of Chemical Sacraments, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 879 n.3.
9. Every state has enacted some form of controlled substances act that regulates
psychedelic drugs in some way. The federal government regulates all psychedelic drugs
through the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841-49 (1976).
W0. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Note that this case originated in the Utah Territory and
therefore the federal courts had jurisdiction and the first amendment to the United States
Constitution was applicable. The free exercise clause at this point in time was not a
restriction upon the states. See note 3 supra.




asserted as one of his defenses that enforcement of the statute
denied the free exercise of his religion.' 2 The defendant was a
practicing Mormon, and one of the accepted doctrines of the
Mormon Church at that time was the duty to practice polygamy.' 3
The defendant claimed that this was not simply encouraged,
rather it was demanded (where circumstances permitted) and the
penalty for failure to so engage was eternal damnation.' 4 The
Court was not impressed with this argument and, after examining
the history of antipolygamy laws, decided that the one under con-
sideration was valid. The Court drew a distinction between reli-
gious beliefs and religious practices, which was to be the basis for
several opinions in the future: "Congress was deprived of all leg-
islative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach ac-
tions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of
good order."' 5 The Court in Reynolds effectively denied any
religious freedom as it related to actions, reserving religious
freedom for beliefs only.
The Reynolds decision was subsequently reinforced in another
polygamy case, Davis v. Beason." This case involved a statute
enacted in Idaho Territory that prohibited a bigamist or a polyg-
amist from voting or holding office. The statute was attacked as
being violative of the free exercise clause.'" The Court rejected
this argument, stating: "It was never intended or supposed that
the [first] amendment could be invoked as a protection against
legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good
order, and morals of society."' 8 The Court further stated that
"[h]owever free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subor-
dinate to the criminal laws of the country. . . ."19 Therefore, as
the first amendment was interpreted at the turn of the century,
there was no real limitation placed upon Congress, and religious
freedom posed no defense to any type of criminal prosecution.
Cantwell v. Connecticut marked a turning point for the
Supreme Court and its views toward the free exercise clause.2" In
12. Id. at 161.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
16. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
17. The defendant in this case was convicted of conspiring to unlawfully obstruct the
due administration of the law. The defendant allegedly had encouraged polygamists and
bigamists to register to vote.
18. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 342-43.
20. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
19831
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this case, a Jehovah's Witness (Cantwell) and his sons were so-
liciting religious contributions without a state certificate authoriz-
ing such activity. The Cantwells solicited in a predominantly
Catholic neighborhood, going from house to house, playing an
anti-Catholic recording for anyone who consented to listen.2'
Cantwell and his sons were charged with breach of the peace and
soliciting without a certificate and were subsequently convicted.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Cantwells argued that the
convictions violated their first amendment rights. The Supreme
Court agreed, finding the first amendment applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.22 The Court then proceeded
to state that to condition religious solicitation "upon a license,
the grant of which rests in ... determination by state authority as
to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the
exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution .. ,"I The
Court found the state had less drastic means available to prevent
fraud and preserve peace, safety, and order, and to achieve these
ends there should be "a statute narrowly drawn to define and
punish specific conduct. -2.4 The Court obviously had
deviated from the position taken in Reynolds and Davis and
recognized that the free exercise clause did act to limit the govern-
ment (both state and federal) in its regulation of actions as well as
beliefs. 25
The Supreme Court retreated somewhat from its position
taken in Cantwell when it later handed down its decision in
Braunfeld v. Brown.2 6 In this case the Court decided that Sunday
closing laws did not unduly interfere with an Orthodox Yew's
freedom of religion.27 Two years later, however, the Court decided
Sherbert v. Verner,28 and the position taken in Cantwell was im-
mensely strengthened.
21. Id. at 301.
22. Id. at 303.
23. Id. at 307.
24. Id. at 311. For a further analysis of Cantwell, see TRIBE, supra note 2, at §
14-10.
25. For other solicitation cases addressed by the Supreme Court, see Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
26. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
27. Perhaps the Court was attempting to achieve consistency with its prior opinion in
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In that case the Court found that Sunday
closing laws do not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. However,
such a result does not necessarily follow since the free exercise clause and the establish-
ment clause are separate and distinct limitations placed upon the government.




In Sherbert a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church
(Sherbert) was discharged for refusing to work on Saturday, her
religion's day of rest. 29 Since she would not work on Saturday she
was unable to find employment and she filed for compensation
benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation
Act. These benefits were subsequently denied because she had
refused offered employment "without good cause." 3 The
Supreme Court found that this denial of benefits infringed upon
Sherbert's free exercise of religion. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court laid down a two-pronged test: for the statute to with-
stand constitutional challenge there must either be no infringe-
ment on religion or there must be a compelling state interest to
justify the burden placed on religion.3' In Sherbert the Court
found that there was a burden on religion, with no compelling
state interest to justify it.32 For this reason the statute as applied
was unconstitutional. The importance of this case lies in the fact
that it marks the first time the Supreme Court expressly applied
the highest level of scrutiny to a case involving one's free exercise
of religion. This level of scrutiny has persisted and is still the
recognized standard today.
The most recent decisions dealing with the free exercise of reli-
gion have applied basically the same test used in Sherbert, though
using slightly different language. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,33 the
Court was faced with the issue of whether a compulsory school
attendance law infringed on free exercise of religion by the mem-
bers of the Old Order Amish. The Court answered this query in
the affirmative, applying a strict scrutiny analysis. The compul-
sory attendance law in that case required all children to attend
school until reaching the age of sixteen.3" The Amish wished only
to send their children to school through the eighth grade and then
teach them the Amish ways of life outside the classroom from
then on. The Amish claimed that sending their children to school
29. Id. at 399-400.
30. Id. at 401.
31. Id. at 403.
32. The state has the burden of showing a compelling interest exists and in Sherbert
it failed to sustain this burden. The state in Sherbert attempted to justify its denial of
benefits on the ground that there would be a possibility of "spurious" claims diluting the
fund and disrupting work schedules. The Court, however, found that the state had the
burden of proving no alternative forms of regulation would combat these abuses without
infringing on first amendment rights. This the state did not do. Id. at 407.
33. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
34. Id. at 207.
19831
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beyond the eighth grade would unduly infringe on their religious
practices. In finding that the compulsory attendance law was un-
constitutional as applied to the Amish, the Court once again re-
lied on a two-pronged standard: "[I]t must appear either that the
state does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its re-
quirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude
to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exer-
cise Clause."" Although the Court used the phrase "sufficient
magnitude" rather than the word "compelling," it clarified itself
by stating that "only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to
the free exercise of religion.' 3 6 As was the conclusion in Sherbert,
the Court found that there was an infringement on religion that
was not justified by any compelling state interest."
It is important to note the significance of the Supreme Court's
holding in Sherbert and subsequent reinforcement in Yoder. Not
only did the Court finally apply the strictest level of scrutiny to
free exercise claims, but in doing so it also effectively rejected the
reasoning used in both Reynolds and Davis. The Court in
Sherbert recognized the result in Reynolds (i.e., that the practice
of polygamy can be regulated by the government even though a
religious tenet of the Mormon Church), but found this result to
be valid on different grounds than those actually applied in
Reynolds. In Sherbert the Court distinguished the finding in
Reynolds on the ground that polygamy "invariably posed some
substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." 38 Therefore,
the Court was actually applying a strict scrutiny test to the facts
presented in Reynolds, and achieved the same result outlined by
the Court almost ninety years before. However, in Reynolds the
Court applied a belief-action distinction to justify its result,39 and
it was this reasoning that was rejected by the Court in Sherbert.40
35. Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
37. The Yoder standard-that the state have "interests of the highest order"-has
recently been applied by the Supreme Court in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628
(1978). In that case the Court invalidated a state statute banning ministers and priests
from serving as delegates to a state constitutional convention.
38. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
39. See discussion preceding note 15, supra.
40. Several authorities have recognized that the reasoning expressed in Reynolds is
no longer sound. Professor Laurence Tribe has expressed his belief that in the wake of
Sherbert, Reynolds is one "of the most obvious candidates for review.... ." TRIBE, supra
note 2, § 14-10 at 853. Tribe's reasoning is that in light of Sherbert the belief-action





As established in the foregoing pages, part of the test now used
by the Supreme Court in analyzing freedom of religion cases re-
quires some type of burden placed on religion.' This prong of
the test actually assumes that what is being burdened is in fact a
"religion." It is not enough to allege, however, that one's beliefs
are "religious"; the court must be convinced of this fact before it
need even apply the test established by the Supreme Court." In
order to better understand what is considered "religion" for the
purpose of this analysis, it is important to review what the
Supreme Court has said on the issue in the past. "3
In Davis v. Beason,"4 the Supreme Court stated: "[T]he term
religion has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator,
and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and
character, and of obedience to his will." '4 5 This view has lost
favor with the Court, and in United States v. Ballard46 the
Supreme Court decided that religion could not be defined so
simply:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put
to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious ex-
"question, after Sherbert, must be whether the monogamy-promotion goal is sufficiently
crucial to the goal's attainment, to warrant the resulting burden on religious conscience."
Id. at 854.
J. Morris Clark also expressed his belief that the dichotomy presented in Reynolds
(i.e., distinguishing between beliefs and actions) was rejected by the Court in Sherbert.
Clark, Guidelines For the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 328 (1969). See
also Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development, Part L
The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1406-07 (1967), where it was
recognized that the belief-action distinction used in Reynolds has been fully discredited;
Finer, Psychedelics and Religious Freedom, 19 HAST. L.J. 667 (1968), where Reynolds
was distinguished from Sherbert on the grounds that in Reynolds there was a substantial
threat to public safety, peace, or order.
Note also that because the Reynolds reasoning has been discredited, so then has the
reasoning used in Davis because Davis relied almost exclusively on Reynolds.
41. See discussion preceding notes 31 and 35, supra.
42. "Such a showing is necessary if the concept of required accommodation is not to
become a limitless excuse for avoiding all unwanted legal obligation." TRIBE, supra note
2, § 14-11 at 859. If one did not have to prove that his beliefs constituted a "religion,"
one could simply claim that he acted in a given way due to religious beliefs and thus avail
himself of a possible freedom of religion defense.
43. For an extended discussion of what constitutes religion, see Note, Toward a
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978).
44. 133 U.S. 333 (1890), discussed supra, text accompanying note 16.
45. Id. at 342.
46. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
1983]
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periences which are as real as life to some may be incompre-
hensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the
ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect
before the law.47
In making this statement the Court recognized that there is no
certain definition for what "religion" is, and contrary to the view
expressed in Davis, it found that it need not be of a conventional
nature.
In Torcaso v. Watkins4" the Court once and for all laid to rest
any notion that religion consists of a belief in a Supreme Being.
In that case the Maryland constitution required a prospective
public officer to declare a belief in the existence of "God." The
Court found that the government cannot force one to profess
such a belief, for such a requirement would violate the establish-
ment clause.49 The Court also explicitly identified as religious
beliefs the following, none of which profess a belief in a Supreme
Being in the conventional sense: Buddhism, Taoism, ethical
culture, and secular humanism. 0 In two later cases the Supreme
Court reemphasized its finding that religion need not include a
belief in a Supreme Being. United States v. Seeger"' and Welsh v.
United States5 2 both involved the interpretation of a provision
contained in the Universal Military Training and Service Act of
1948. This provision required a belief "in a relation to a Supreme
Being" before one could qualify for conscientious objector
status. In Seeger the Court construed this language so as not to
discriminate between atheists and followers of religions. The
Court found that a distinction between the two would lead to ob-
vious constitutional difficulties. Welsh later construed the same
provision and found that purely ethical and moral considerations
are religious in nature. The result of these two decisions not only
reemphasizes the fact that religion need not include a belief in a
Supreme Being, but also blurs the distinction, if any, between
47. Id. at 86-87. Ballard was a case involving a mail fraud prosecution. The defend-
ants had solicited money on the representation that they were divine messengers. The
Court found that whether the defendants' beliefs were true or not could not be submitted
to the jury. All that could be submitted for determination was their sincerity in those
beliefs.
48. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
49. Id. at 495.
:50. Id. at 495 n.11.
:51. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).




religion and morality. 3 In any event, the important point that
results from the foregoing Supreme Court decisions is that no
concrete definition exists of the term "religion." Basically, all
that has been delineated is that religion does not have to include a
belief in a Supreme Being. 4
Requirements of Sincerity and Centrality
Closely tied with the question of whether a religion does in fact
exist are the questions of whether one sincerely follows the pro-
fessed beliefs and whether the tenets actually burdened are central
to the religious belief. In Ballard5 the Court held that the truth
of one's religious beliefs could not be questioned; however, the
sincerity of the defendant in following that belief could be sub-
mitted for determination by the trier of fact. Therefore, while the
court cannot decide whether what the defendant believes is true,
it can decide the factual question of whether the defendant is sin-
cere in his beliefs.
Centrality on the other hand is not so easily disposed of.
Whether a tenet is central to one's religious beliefs seems to be
closely tied in with the balancing test applied by the Court in
Sherbert.16 Under that test, the state's compelling interests, if
any, must be balanced against the burdens imposed upon the reli-
gion The more central the burdened belief is to the religion, the
more compelling it will be to deny the interest of the state. The
less central the belief is to the religion, the easier it becomes to
justify the burden through some state interests. Thus, in Sherbert
the Court found the belief in one's Sabbath not to be overcome
by the state's interests in preventing fraudulent claims' and en-
hancing administrative convenience. Also, in Yoder," the Court
found the Amish interest in life-style coupled with religion to be
sufficient to overcome the state's interest in compulsory educa-
tion. Thus, in deciding whether a belief is central to a valid reli-
gion, the Court actually seems to be engaging in the balancing
test it prescribed in Sherbert."
53. See Note, supra note 43, at 1065.
54. At least one authority has set forth the proposition that whatever is "arguably
religious" should be considered as such and therefore satisfies the religion requirement.
TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-6 at 828.
55. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
56. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
57. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 250 (1972).
58. For a further analysis of "sincerity" and "centrality," see TRIBE, supra note 2, §
14-11; Comment, supra note 8, at 925-3 1.
1983]
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In psychedelic drug cases, the centrality issue has taken on
added significance. Courts have been reluctant to find a belief in
drug use to be central to a religious belief and therefore have re-
jected free exercise claims. However, throughout the cases dis-
cussed, the question that arises is whether the court is applying
centrality in the balancing test used, or whether the court is simply
using centrality as a reason to reject the defense outright. The lat-
ter seems to be the prevailing view.5 9
II. The Psychedelic Drug Cases
With the basic constitutional standards and requirements es-
tablished by the Supreme Court addressed, how have they been
applied by courts faced with a freedom of religion defense in a
psychedelic drug case? Most of the cases involving this defense
have come about subsequent to Sherbert, with the exception of
one, State v. Big Sheep.60 The Montana Supreme Court was
faced with the issue of whether a statute making it illegal to sell,
furnish, or give away peyote was violative of the Montana con-
stitution as applied to a Crow Indian. 6 ' The defendant in that
case was a member of the Native American Church and alleged
that as a member of this church he used peyote for sacramental
purposes 2.6  After dealing with a fundamental jurisdictional ques-
59. The connection between centrality and the freedom of religion defense in psyche-
delic drug prosecutions is examined throughout this article on a case-by-case basis. It
should be noted that several of the cases never address centrality at all due to their ruling
that as a matter of law religion is no defense. Several other cases fail to address centrality
because they have disposed of the issue by other means. For an extended discussion of
centrality as applied in various free exercise of religion cases, see Comment, supra note 8,
at 925-28.
60. 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1926).
61. The Montana constitution provided:
The. free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination, shall forever hereafter be guaranteed, and no person shall be denied
any civil or political right or privilege on account of his opinions concerning religion,
but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense with
oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness, by bigamous or polygamous mar-
riage, or otherwise, or justify practices inconsistent with the good order, peace, or
safety of the state, or opposed to the civil authority thereof, or of the United States.
Mor. CONST. art. 3, § 4 (emphasis added). It is easy to see why the court would not
recognize this defense since it is basically excluded from this provision.
62. 75 Mont. at 221, 243 P. at 1068. The religious belief in peyote was founded on
chapter 14 of Romans, chapter 53 of Isaiah, second verse, and chapter 2 of Revelations,
verse 17 of the King James' Version of the Holy Bible. Id. The court responded to this
contention by stating:
We do not find peyote or any life herb mentioned by Isaiah, or by Saint Paul in his
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol11/iss2/4
tion, 63 the court turned to the defendant's freedom of religion
claim. The court rejected this defense and ruled as a matter of
law that under the Montana constitution no freedom of religion
defense existed. 6 The court stated: "[Wihile laws cannot in-
terfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may inhibit
acts or practices which tend toward the subversion of the civil
government, or which are made criminal by the law of the
land." ' 6  Even though the court relied on state constitutional
grounds to reject the freedom of religion defense, its holding was
consistent with the federal constitutional standard applied in the
polygamy cases. 66 Questions arise, however, as to whether courts
in the years following Sherbert have applied the appropriate stan-
dard demanded by that case and whether they have applied that
standard correctly.
California Sets the Stage
In 1964 the California Supreme Court handed down an inter-
esting decision. In People v. Woody67 the defendants were mem-
bers of the Native American Church and had been arrested for
possessing peyote. The defendants were subsequently convicted
of this offense even though it was stipulated at trial that at the
time of their arrest the defendants were engaging in a religious
ceremony.68 On appeal the defendants continued to assert that
the statute as applied violated their right to the free exercise of
epistle to the Romans, nor does it seem from the language employed that Saint John
the Divine had any such in mind. It is true that Isaiah speaks of a root out of a dry
ground. There is a slight resemblance here, as peyote is said to be a product of the cac-
tus plant. . . .These excellent precepts are worthy of much greater observation than
they receive; but, if carried to the length defendant insists upon, the use of opium, co-
caine, and even "moonshine" might be justified under the guise of religious obser-
vance.
Id. at 239, 243 P. at 1073.
63. The defendant had been arrested on Indian land, and thus the court was forced
to examine jurisdictional precedent extensively. Finally, the court decided to remand the
case to the trial court for the sole purpose of answering whether the defendant was ar-
rested on "emancipated" land. Id. at 236, 243 P. at 1072.
64. Note that at this point in time the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion had not been made applicable to the states. This did not take place until the Supreme
Court so applied it in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
65. 75 Mont. at 240, 243 P. at 1073.
66. The court cited Davis favorably as standing for the distinction made between
beliefs and actions. Id. at 239, 243 P. at 1073.
67. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964), rev'g 35 Cal. Rptr. 708
(1963).
68. 61 Cal. 2d at 717, 394 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
1983] NOTES
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their religion. In analyzing this contention, the California
Supreme Court first recognized the standard set forth in Sher-
bert, stating that "the Court in Sherbert thus utilized a two-fold
analysis which calls for a determination of, first, whether the ap-
plication of the statute imposes any burden upon the free exercise
of the defendants' religion, and second, if it does, whether some
compelling state interest justifies the infringement.' '6
In applying this test to the facts at hand, the court proceeded
to study the Native American Church's religion to see if it was
burdened by the enforcement of the statute. The court concluded
that it was, finding the "central event" to be the use of peyote at
the religious meeting, and the meeting itself to be the "corner-
stone" of the religion.7" The court also relied on the long history
of peyotism and the belief of church members that it was sacri-
legious to use peyote for any purpose other than for sacramental
use.7' Since peyote itself was the object of worship and so impor-
tant to the religion," the court concluded that "[t]o forbid the
use of peyote is to remove the theological heart of Peyotism." 7
Once the court had come to this conclusion, the burden was on
the state to demonstrate some compelling interest to justify its in-
trusion on the religious belief. The state asserted that peyote had
deleterious effects on the Indian community and that an exemp-
tion would make enforcement of the laws extremely difficult. The
69. Id. at 719, 394 P.2d at 816, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
70. Id. at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
71. Id. The articles of incorporation of the Native American Church of the State of
California provide in part:
That we as a people place explicit faith and hope and belief in the Almighty God and
declare full, competent, and everlasting faith in our church things which and by we
worship God. That we further pledge ourselves to work for unity with the sacramental
use of peyote and its religious use.
Id. at 717, 394 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
72. The court found that "[a]lthough peyote serves as a sacramental symbol similar
to bread and wine in certain Christian Churches, it is more than a sacrament. Peyote con-
stitutes in itself an object of worship; prayers are directed to it much as prayers are
devoted to the Holy Ghost." Id. at 721, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
73. Id. at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74. Note that the court was never
faced on appeal with whether this was a religion since it was stipulated at trial that the
defendants were engaged in a religious meeting. What the court had determined at this
stage of the appeal was that the belief infringed upon was actually a central part of the
religion. The court also determined that the defendants were sincere in their belief and
stated that "the court makes a factual examination of the bona fides of the belief and
does not intrude into the religious issue at all; it does not determine the nature of the





state further argued that the Indians might try to use peyote in
place of medical care, and that the drug might lead them to the
use of more harmful drugs. Finally, it was claimed that there was
a threat of indoctrination of small children. The court summarily
rejected the arguments concerning indoctrination of children, the
supplanting of medical care, and the possible use of more harm-
ful drugs as not being supported by the record. The court also
found that peyote has no deleterious effects. Finally, the court
analogized the "difficulty of enforcement" argument to a similar
argument rejected in Sherbert." For the state to succeed under
such an argument, the court found that it must be able to demon-
strate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such
abuses without infringing on first amendment rights." The state
failed to demonstrate a lack of feasible options and, therefore,
the defendants' convictions were reversed. 76
The California Supreme Court applied the standard established
in Sherbert and achieved a legitimate result." The result should
not have been too surprising given the context in which it arose
and the test that was applied. The Native American Church was
an established church, first incorporated in Oklahoma in 1918,
and was now incorporated in California. Peyotism had roots
dating back to 1560 A.D., and the Indians who used peyote were re-
sponsible in its use. All of these factors led to the result achieved
by the court.
California Revisited
Immediately following Woody the California Supreme Court
handed down another opinion that followed the same lines of
reasoning previously discussed. In In re Grady78 the petitioner
74. Id. at 719, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
75. Id. at 723, 394 P.2d at 819, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
76. For some reason the court felt compelled to distinguish Reynolds from the case
at hand. The court found that in Reynolds the burdened belief (polygamy) was not essen-
tial to the practice of the Mormon religion, and also that the degree of danger to state in-
terests in that case far exceeded any danger in the present situation. Since the court had to
apply the Sherbert analysis, there is no real reason why the court should have bothered
distinguishing Reynolds, which at this point in time (though never expressly overruled)
was not good law. See supra note 40.
The court also distinguished Braunfeld as being a case where there was only an "inci-
dental" infringement on religion and a strong state interest. Id. at 725, 394 P.2d at 820,
40 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
77. Id. at 725, 394 P.2d at 820, 40 Cal. Rptr. 76.
78. 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964).
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had been arrested and charged with possession of peyote. The
petitioner pled guilty at trial, but subsequently applied for a
writ of habeas corpus to achieve his release. On petition to the
California Supreme Court, the petitioner claimed that he used
peyote for religious purposes and therefore could not be pro-
secuted. The court granted the writ and ordered a new trial for
the reason that "[a] factual question remains as to whether defen-
dant actually engaged in good faith in the practice of a reli-
gion." 7 9 The court recognized that in light of Woody, freedom of
religion was a valid defense, even though petitioner did not claim
to be a member of the Native American Church. 0 If on retrial,
the petitioner could show that he engaged in the good faith prac-
tice of a bona fide religion, the court ordered that he could not be
prosecuted. This result is somewhat inconsistent with the analysis
applied in Woody. In Grady the court effectively abandoned the
second part of the Sherbert analysis, thus not allowing the state
an opportunity to prove its compelling interest. The error in this
approach is that in cases not involving the Native American
Church the factors used to overcome the state's interests may not
exist. The Grady court assumed as a matter of law that where
peyote was being used there could be no compelling state interest.
The court interpreted Woody to mean that "the state may not
prohibit the use of peyote in connection with bona fide practice
of a religious belief."'" This was obviously a misinterpretation of
Woody because the court in Woody had laid great emphasis on
the characteristics of the Native American Church in comparison
with the state's interests. Other religions and beliefs would have
to be! analyzed in a similar fashion as they presented themselves to
the courts.
The California Court of Appeals began the process of clarify-
ing the holdings in Woody and Grady. In People v. Mitchell2 the
defendant had been convicted of possession of marijuana and
79. Id. at 888, 394 P.2d at 729, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
80. Petitioner claimed to be a "peyote preacher" and a "way shower" acting as the
spiritual leader for a certain group of individuals. Id.
81. Id. The court obviously misinterpreted what it decided in Woody. The only way
the court could have logically achieved the result reached in Grady would be if the peti-
tioner himself claimed to be a member of the Native American Church. Then the compel-
ling state interests analysis discussed in Woody would have been applicable. Absent this
fact it would seem that the court once again would have to compare the compelling in-
terests with the bona fides of the petitioner's particular religion. Perhaps petitioner's
belief was to administer peyote to children, etc.; then the state's interests in preventing
this might justify prosecution.




planting and cultivating marijuana. At trial, the defendant test-
ified that he used marijuana pursuant to a religious belief and
quoted various passages from the Bible as authority for its use."
The trial court, however, refused to instruct the jury concerning
these religious beliefs, and the defendant was subsequently con-
victed. On appeal, the court found that the trial judge was correct
in refusing to give the requested jury instructions. The court dis-
tinguished Woody on two grounds; first, the defendant in Woody
was a member of an organized religion, and second, peyote was
central to the practice of religion in that case.8 ' The court also
found that the evidence presented in Woody "showed that such
use of peyote, under the safeguards prescribed by the church, had
no antisocial consequences and that the danger of misuse of the
substance, under improper claim of religious immunity was min-
imal.'" Finally, the court stated that the defendant failed to
show that he used marijuana for religious purposes; rather, "he
was expressing only his own personal philosophy and way of
life." 8 6 Thus the court decided as a matter of law that there was
no religion being burdened in the case.
In People v. Collins7 the California Court of Appeals reached
the same result, but through slightly different reasoning. Here,
the defendant had stipulated before the trial judge that he "sub-
jectively, holds a belief in marijuana, with respect to its being
used for religious purposes, honestly and in good faith. .... -1
Defendant was subsequently convicted of possessing marijuana,
and on appeal his conviction was sustained. The court found that
"defendant does not worship or sanctify marijuana, but employs
its hallucinogenic biochemical properties as an auxiliary to a de-
sired capacity for communication." 89 For this reason, the court
found that marijuana was not "indispensable" to his faith. 90
However, the court did not use this reasoning to conclude that no
religion existed, rather, the court proceeded to find that a com-
pelling state interest did exist, 9' which justified the intrusion upon
the religion.
83. Id. at 179, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
84. Id. at 182, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 273 Cal. App. 2d 486, 78 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1969).
88. Id., 78 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. This would seem to fit into the "centrality" theme expressed earlier. Where a
belief is not central to the religion it is easier to find a compelling interest to overcome it.
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JIn People v. Werber" the California Court of Appeals faced
facts similar to those presented in Mitchell and Collins. The de-
fendant had been charged with possession and cultivation of
marijuana, and at trial testified, along with various acquaintances
and authorities, that he used marijuana for religious purposes.
The trial court ruled that the defendant's use of marijuana did
not constitute a religious practice, and the defendant was subse-
quently convicted. 3 The California Court of Appeals affirmed,
finding that in the absence of evidence that marijuana is an ob-
ject: of worship, the state has compelling interests to prevent its
use.94 The court once again failed to decide whether there was in
fact a religion, but instead simply found, upon the facts pre-
sented, that the state was justified in prohibiting the drug's use. 9"
Finally, in People v. Mullins" the defendant was charged with
possession of marijuana and as a defense claimed that he used it
for religious purposes. The defendant offered to prove through
his own and other witnesses' testimony that he worshipped mari-
juana, that marijuana was exclusively a religious ritual, that mari-
juana constituted an integral part of his religious belief and prac-
tice, and that he used marijuana pursuant to an honestly held
good faith religious belief. Defendant also claimed that he pro-
vided safeguards against the misuse of the drug. Despite this
elaborate offer of proof, the trial court refused to hear the claim,
ruling that the evidence did not constitute a defense.97
On appeal, the court recognized the two-step analysis applied
in Woody and attempted to apply it to the present set of facts.
The court found that the first step actually encompassed two
separate determinations, "i.e., whether the statute imposes any
burden upon the free exercise of the religion whose religious
beliefs the defendant asserts he embraces and whether the defen-
dant actually engaged in good faith in that religion." 9 The court
found the first determination to be a question of law and the sec-
ond determination to be a question of fact. If these two questions
See v'upra text accompanying note 58.
92. 19 Cal. App. 3d 598, 97 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1971).
93. Id. at 607, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
94. Id. at 608.
95. Id.
96. 50 Cal. App. 3d 61, 123 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1975).
97. It seems clear that even under the previous California Court of Appeals deci-
sions, if the defendant could have proven these allegations he should have at least pro-
ceeded to invoke the second stage of the analysis, i.e., shifting the burden of proof to the
state to show some compelling interest.
98. Id. at 72, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 206-07 (emphasis added).
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were answered in the affirmative, then the second step of the
Woody analysis had to be addressed. The second part of the
analysis, Whether there is a compelling state interest to justify the
burden placed on religion, is then a question of law. In this case,
the court found it unnecessary to reach the second part of the
analysis because, as a matter of law, the defendant's offer of
proof was insufficient to satisfy the first step of the Woody
analysis.9 9 Obviously, if the offer of proof made by the defendant
in this case was insufficient, it will be very difficult indeed to ever
make a sufficient offer of proof. It appears that if what the de-
fendant offered to prove were actually proved, this would have
been sufficient to shift the burden to the state. Therefore, the
court's reasoning in foreclosing such proof is highly suspect.
Through its holdings in Mitchell, Collins, Werber, and
Mullins, the California Court of Appeals effectively narrowed
Woody to the specific set of facts found in that case. Though re-
cognizing the analysis adopted in Woody and applying it in some
respects, the court of appeals was able to manipulate the various
parts of the analysis in order to achieve the desired result. Finally,
in Mullins, the court effectively wiped out any freedom of re-
ligion defense advanced by an individual by finding the offer of
proof made to be insufficient as a matter of law. If the offer of
proof made in Mullins was insufficient on its face, then it would
seem that no offer of proof would be enough to satisfy the first
step of the Woody analysis, which would effectively abolish any
freedom of religion defense in the psychedelic drug context, at
least when brought by an individual not belonging to an organ-
ized religion.' 00
99. Id., 123 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
100. In People v. Torres, 133 Cal. App. 3d 265, 277, 184 Cal. Rptr. 39, 46 (1982), the
California Court of Appeals distinguished Woody in a case involving the defendant's
possession and distribution of marijuana:
Defendant's testimony makes it apparent that marijuana is not, as peyote was in
Woody, such an integral part of defendant's religion that prohibition of marijuana
will inhibit defendant's free exercise of religion. Furthermore, there was no evidence
presented.., indicating that defendant's church had prescribed safeguards against the
dangers of misuse of marijuana.
Therefore, the court of appeals did recognize that where the drug's use forms an "integral
part" of the religion, the first amendment may pose a defense to prosecution. However,
the court's analysis is not quite clear. The defendant's free exercise of religion was ob-
viously inhibited if his claims were true. Whether the use of marijuana was so "integral"
a part of the religion as to result in an unjustifiable denial of the religion's free exercise is
a question that should properly be addressed as a part of the second part of the Sherbert
analysis, i.e., whether a compelling state interest justifies the infringement. See infra note
196 and accompanying text.
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Following the Lead of Woody
Very few courts have fallen in line with the decision set forth in
Woody. The first court to do so was the Arizona Court of Ap-
peals in State v. Whittingham.'10 In that case the defendants were
charged with possession of peyote after being arrested during a
raid on a ceremony. They were convicted of the charges and ap-
pealed on the ground that they were being denied the free exercise
of their religion. On appeal, the court recognized the test set
forth in Sherbert and applied it to the facts of the case at hand. 10
First, the court found that, as defendants were members of the
Native American Church, peyote was an integral part of the de-
fendants' worship. The court also found that absent the use of
peyote the defendants could not practice their religious beliefs. "0
The burden then shifted to the state to show some compelling in-
terest to justify the burden placed on defendants' religious
beliefs. This the state failed to do and the convictions were re-
versed. 14 In its conclusion the court stated that:
[I]t is a defense to... prosecution to show that the peyote was
being used in connection with a bona fide practice of a
religious belief; that it was an integral part of the religious exer-
cise; and that it was used in a manner not dangerous to the
public health, safety or morals.' °5
To this date, the only other court to follow the reasoning of
Sherbert and Woody has been the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals. In Whitehorn v. State, 06 the defendant was convicted
of possession of peyote. The defendant was a member of the
Native American Church and claimed that at the time he pos-
sessed the peyote it was being used for religious purposes. On ap-
peal, the court recognized that the Native American Church is an
established religion with a long and continuous history. The court
101. 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973), petition denied, 110 Ariz. 279, 517 P.2d
1275, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974).
102. 19 Ariz. App. at 29, 504 P.2d at 952.
103. Id.
104. The court noted that had the drug been narcotic or addictive the state would
have had a much stronger argument. However, because peyote is neither, the state could
not show a compelling interest to justify its prohibition. Id. at 30, 504 P.2d at 953.
10.5. Id. at 31, 504 P.2d at 954. Compare this view with that expressed in In re Grady.
Grady misinterpreted Woody to mean that it is a defense simply to show that peyote is be-
ing us.-d in connection with a bona fide religious practice, without giving the state an op-
portunity to demonstrate any compelling interests.
106. 561 P.2d 539 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
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also recognized the test set forth in Sherbert and applied it to the
facts before it. First, the court found that the question of
membership in the Native American Church was to be decided by
the trier of fact. Second, the court ruled that whether the facts
were sufficient to prove that the defendant was engaged in a bona
fide religious practice was a question of law to be determined by
the court.' 7 Finally, applying the last part of the Sherbert
analysis, the court ruled that, as a matter of law, there was no
compelling state interest to prevent the members of the Native
American Church from possessing peyote.' °0 Therefore, in the
future when one is charged with possession of peyote, all that
need be proved is that the person is a member of the Native
American Church and that the person is engaging in a bona fide
religious practice. 0 9
The cases that have followed the Sherbert and Woody rationale
have basically stayed very close to the same factual situation pre-
sented in Woody. The two cases that have expressly followed the
Sherbert/Woody two-step analysis have both dealt with peyote
and the Native American Church. No courts have yet attempted
to expand this approach to include other religions and perhaps
other psychedelic drugs.' 10
Rejecting the Lead
State Court Decisions
In State v. Bullard' the North Carolina Supreme Court de-
cided that the free exercise clause in no way protects defendants
who are charged with possessing drugs." 2 In that case the defen-
107. Id. at 547.
108. Id. Note that the court was concerned here with whether the drug was actually
being used for religious purposes at the time of the arrest and therefore made this one of
the elements to be decided by the court. In the case at bar the defendant was arrested
while driving across the state and had the peyote in his possession. The court was satisfied
that it was a religious practice of the Native American Church to continually possess
peyote and ruled accordingly.
109. Compare this with how the Oklahoma courts have dealt with marijuana, see in-
fra text accompanying note 124.
110. At least one state has statutorily adopted the exemption afforded the Native
American Church and its use of peyote. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6 (1978). The
federal government has also allowed for such an exception to the Controlled Substances
Act. See 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1982), which exempts peyote used for bona fide religious
purposes by members of the Native American Church from 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841-849
(1976). This had led to several problems discussed in text accompanying note 179 infra.
111. 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966).
112. Id. at 602, 148 S.E.2d at 568.
1983] NOTES
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
dant was charged with possessing marijuana and peyote. The de-
fendant was a member of the Neo-American Church and argued
that "peyote is most necessary and marijuana is most advisable"
in the practice of his beliefs." 3 The court found that the free ex-
ercise clause did not protect the defendant even if he were sincere
in his religious beliefs. The court relied on Reynolds and came to
the conclusion that the free exercise clause "does not authorize
[the defendant] . . . to commit acts which constitute threats to the
public safety, morals, peace and order.""" The court neither
cited nor attempted to distinguish Sherbert and thereby left itself
open to serious criticism.' 'I Though Reynolds has never been ex-
pressly overruled, it has in fact been expressly limited," 6 and
there is considerable debate as to whether it has any precedential
value at all." 7 The appropriate standard that should have been
applied in this case was that expressed in Sherbert, and since the
court failed even to cite Sherbert, the soundness of its decision is
questionable.
In Lewellyn v. State"8 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals applied much the same reasoning as that used in Bullard
and is therefore subject to the same criticism. The defendant was
arrested for the possession of marijuana and subsequently con-
victed. At trial, the defendant testified that he was a priest in the
Universal Life Church and that he used marijuana as a sacrament
in the church. On appeal, the court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the statute was unconstitutional, citing Reynolds for
the proposition that "[tlo permit a man to excuse unlawful prac-
tices because of his religious belief would be to make the pro-
fessed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto him-
self.""' 9 However, the court concluded by stating that the use of
marijuana imposes a "substantial risk to society."'' 20 Whether
this was a reference to the strict scrutiny analysis required by
113. Id.
114. Id. at 603, 148 S.E.2d at 568-69.
115. At least one authority has singled out this decision as being questionable: "In an
unsatisfactory opinion [State v. Bullard] the North Carolina Supreme Court appeared to
rely on the generally discredited belief-action distinction of Reynolds . . ." Giannella,
supra note 40, at 1406-07.
116. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953).
117. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
118. 489 P.2d 511 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
119. Id. at 515 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167).




Sherbert is an open question since the court failed to cite that de-
cision. In any event, it would appear that the court here relied ex-
clusively on Reynolds, which in light of Sherbert leaves the
court's reasoning open to serious question.' 2'
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had a chance to re-
examine its reasoning in Lewellyn in a subsequent case with
similar but distinguishable facts. In Lewellyn v. State 22 (Lewellyn
I/), the defendant was-a priest in the Holy American Church. He
was convicted of unlawful delivery of marijuana to an under-
cover police officer.' 23 The defendant asserted the free exercise
clause as his defense and appealed the conviction as being un-
constitutional. On appeal, the court recognized that the Reynolds
decision had eroded and therefore decided that the appropriate
standard to be applied was that expressed in Sherbert.124 In the
case before it, however, the court found that it was unnecessary
to apply the two-stage analysis of Sherbert since the conviction
was not for simple possession; rather, the defendant had been
convicted of selling marijuana. Since the buyer was not even a
church member, the court found it obvious that the freedom of
religion defense did not apply. Though the conviction was af-
firmed, the court did adopt the appropriate standard laid down in
Sherbert, and in effect corrected its previously erroneous reason-
ing expressed in Lewellyn 1,25
At least two other courts have exhibited questionable reasoning
in rejecting the freedom of religion defense in psychedelic drug
prosecutions. In Gaskin v. State,'26 the Tennessee Supreme Court
rejected the defendants' claim that their right to the free exercise
of religion had been violated and stated: "The argument of the
121. Compare this decision with Whitehorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1977),
discussed supra note 108 and accompanying text, which exempted peyote. In light of that
court's application of the two-stage analysis found in Sherbert, the holding in Lewellyn
would seem to have even less value.
122. 592 P.2d 538 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
123. Id. at 539.
124. Id. at 541.
125. Lewellyn, the defendant in both cases cited, is a persistent and interesting
character. He claimed to be a priest in the Universal Life Church in the first prosecution,
and in the second prosecution alleged that he was a priest in the Holy American Church.
Lewellyn was also subsequently involved in another case, L'Aquarias v. Maynard, 634
P.2d 1310 (Okla. 1981). In that case, Lewellyn (or L'Aquarias as he was then known) as
an inmate brought an action to compel the prison to provide him with marijuana, a sacra-
ment in his religion. This was rejected by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in a very short
opinion.
126. 490 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn.), app. dismissed, 414 U.S. 886 (1973).
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defendants that the statute as applied to them violates their rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States is without merit."' 27 In that case the defend-
ants had been convicted of manufacturing marijuana. The court
relied heavily on Reynolds for the authority to reject their
freedom of religion claim.
Similar reasoning was used in the Missouri case of State v.
Randall,'2' where the defendant was charged with possession of
marijuana, hashish, and LSD. The defendant argued that as a
minister in the Aquarian Brotherhood Church, he used the drugs
for purposes of meditation. The court rejected this argument and
the reasoning used in Woody, citing instead Davis v. Beason 129
for the proposition that "'[I]t was never intended or supposed
that the [first] amendment could be invoked as a protection
against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the
peace, good order and morals of society.' ,,"" Neither of these
courts cited or distinguished the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Sherbert. Rather, both seemed to rely on the belief-action distinc-
tion originally set forth in Reynolds and later applied in Davis.
Since this distinction has eroded (and arguably has been com-
pletely overruled by Sherbert),' the decisions are open to serious
question.' 32
There have been several other courts that have recognized and
applied the constitutional analysis set forth in Sherbert and utilized
in Woody. These courts, however, have applied the Sherbert test
only to reject the freedom of religion defense on one of two sepa-
rate grounds: either that no religious beliefs were being burdened,
or that a compelling state interest existed to justify the burden
placed upon religion. In the New York case of People v.
Crawford,'"1 the defendant had been arrested for possession of
marijuana and LSD. The defendant was a parishioner and minis-
ter of the Church of the Missionaries of the New Truth, whose
127. 490 S.W.2d at 524.
1213. 540 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
129. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
130. 540 S.W.2d at 160 (citing Davis, 133 U.S. at 342-43).
131. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
132. The court in Randall did recognize that there may arise circumstances where
freedom of religion could be a defense. The court stated that "[defendant] has not shown
in any manner that he could bring himself within the tightly drawn confines of the
religious exemption for a violation of the law of this state." 540 S.W.2d at 160 (emphasis
added).
133. 69 Misc. 2d 500, 328 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Crim. Ct. 1972), aff'd, 72 Misc. 2d 1021,
340 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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members used marijuana and LSD to achieve a religious experi-
ence and also to "find God." ' 34 The defendant was convicted
and on appeal relied on the holding in Woody to support his
defense. Assuming Woody to be persuasive precedent, the court
rejected the defendant's claims on the ground that he had failed
to prove that the state had inhibited any part of his religious
belief.' 35 The court found that the defendant could exercise his
religious beliefs in other ways and therefore his defense failed.'
36
A similar approach was taken in New Mexico in State v.
Brashear,'37 where the court recognized the two-stage analysis ap-
plied in Sherbert, but found it unnecessary to apply the second
stage because the defendant was not engaging in the practice of a
religion. Therefore the conviction for possession of marijuana,
was affirmed. In deciding that there was no religion involved, the
court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Yoder.
The court found that Yoder suggested two considerations: first,
whether the belief is of an organized group, and second, whether
it is a traditional belief.' s In the case then before it, the court
found the belief to be neither; rather, it was simply a "personal"
belief.' 39 The court also stated that even if the defendant had
been acting pursuant to a religious belief, the burden on his reli-
gion would still have been justified since a compelling state in-
terest did exist.140
In Town v. State ex rel. Reno,' 4' the Florida Supreme Court
discussed and distinguished in some detail the California Supreme
Court holding in Woody. The state of Florida sought to enjoin
members of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church from using mari-
juana on their church property. At trial the court made several
134. 69 Misc. 2d at 501, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
135. Id. at 507, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
136. Id. at 508, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 755. The court concluded by reserving for future
determination the question of whether it should even adopt the Woody analysis should
the proper facts present themselves. Id.
137. 92 N.M. 622, 593 P.2d 63 (1979).
138. Id., 593 P.2d at 67.
139. Id., 593 P.2d at 68. The court found that whether a belief is religious is a ques-
tion of law for the court. Id., 593 P.2d at 69. If the belief were found to be religious, the
court then had to decide as a matter of law whether it was in fact burdened by the statute.
Only then would the issue of a compelling state interest be addressed. Id.
140. Id., 593 P.2d at 71. The court found that the final question, to be answered only
if all the aforementioned questions were satisfied, consisted of defendant's sincerity. This
was to be left to the trier of fact.
141. 377 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1979), app. dismissed, 449 U.S. 803, reh'g denied, 449 U.S.
1004 (1980).
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findings of fact, including: (1) the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church
is a religion; (2) the use of cannabis (marijuana) is an essential
portion of the religious practice; (3) cannabis, though freely used,
is not itself an object of worship; (4) members of the church
believe that cannabis is the mystical body and blood of Jesus; and
(5) through cannabis, members purportedly find a spirit of love,
unity, and justice, which brings them close to their god.1 2
Despite these findings the court issued the injunction and the
church appealed. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court first
recognized that to justify infringement upon a particular religious
practice the state must demonstrate a compelling interest.143 Since
the trial court had already determined that there was a religious
,belief being infringed upon, it was necessary to decide only if a
compelling interest justified the infringement. The court found
such a compelling interest and in doing so went to great lengths
to distinguish the facts presented in Woody. In the Woody case,
the use of peyote had been restricted to adults and was used only
during a particular ceremony. There was little chance of danger
to outsiders because the ceremony took place in a desert hogan,
and the Indians were very responsible in the use of the drug.' 44
However, in the instant case, the use of cannabis was found to be
continuous throughout the day without restriction. Children and
nonmembers of the church were encouraged to use the drug. Peo-
ple were constantly coming and going from the premises, which
created a danger to outsiders.4 5 Therefore, applying a balancing
test, the court found that the state's interests in protecting the
health of its citizenry was sufficient to overcome the free exercise
interests of the Coptics.
Finally, two other state courts have found compelling interests
sufficient to outweigh free exercise interests, though not applying
the in-depth analysis found in Town. In State v. Soto, 14 the
Oregon Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's refusal to allow
the presentation of evidence concerning defendant's religious be-
liefs. The court recognized that under Sherbert, "only the gravest
142. 377 So. 2d at 649.
143. Id. at 650. The court relied on Yoder and McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618
(1978), for this proposition.
144. 377 So. 2d at 651.
145. Id.
146. 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976). In this




abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for per-
missible limitation."' 47 The court went on to find the preserva-
tion of health and safety to be a compelling enough interest to
justify the "limitation" on religious freedom.
Almost identical reasoning was applied by the Supreme Court
of Vermont in State v. Rocheleau.'4' In that case the defendant
had been convicted of the unlawful possession of marijuana. On
appeal, the court found that the trial court was correct in reject-
ing the defendant's evidence of his religious beliefs. The court
held that the legislature's criminalization of marijuana possession
was sufficient in itself to demonstrate a compelling interest on the
part of the state.'4 9 "It is not the role of this Court to substitute
its judgment for that of the legislature in such matters where, as
here, the legislation challenged has a rational basis."'5 0 Though
claiming to find a "compelling interest" on the part of the
state,'"' the court in reality was applying a rational basis test. If
the court had truly applied a strict scrutiny test, it would not have
hesitated to question the means applied by the state and balance
any state interests against the interests of religious freedom.'
As can be seen in the opinions discussed above, some courts
have exhibited sounder reasoning than others in arriving at
similar results. The courts that have relied on early Supreme
Court precedent, such as the polygamy cases, seem to be highly
suspect in their analysis. The courts applying the two-stage
analysis set forth in Sherbert are on much stronger ground and,
for the most part, exhibit much better reasoning.
Federal Court Decisions
The federal courts have not been overly receptive to the
California Supreme Court's decision in Woody. In fact, to date,
not one federal court has sustained a freedom of religion defense
in a psychedelic drug prosecution. Leary v. United States presents
an interesting illustration.' 3 Dr. Timothy Leary and his daughter
147. 21 Or. App. at 794, 537 P.2d at 143.
148. 451 A.2d 1144 (Vt. 1982).
149. Id. at 1148.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id.
152. Though not using it as a basis for its holding, the court seemed quite skeptical as
to whether the defendant was actually practicing a religion.
153. 383 F.2d 851, reh'g denied, 392 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 392 U.S.
903 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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were stopped while traveling in their car from Mexico back into
the United States. Marijuana was found on the floor of the car
and both passengers were indicted for transporting marijuana in
violation of federal statute." In his testimony at trial Dr. Leary
attempted to justify his possession of the drug on religious and
scientific grounds. Leary asserted that as a convert to Hinduism
and a member of the Brahmakrishna sect, he used marijuana for
religious illumination and meditation.' 5 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals was not impressed with these claims and believed that
Leary's reliance on Sherbert was "misplaced and inapposite of
the facts."' 56 The court instead relied on Davis and Reynolds in
stating that "Congress may prescribe and enforce certain condi-
tions to control conduct which may be contrary to a person's reli-
gious beliefs in the interest of the public welfare and protection
of society."' 57 The court found that Sherbert had recognized a
certain category of cases that required governmental regulation
regardless of religious freedom. 8 The present case fell into that
category, and therefore the court recognized no need to further
address Sherbert.'" Though the Leary decision might be inter-
preted as finding some type of compelling interest to justify reli-
gious infringement, it is more likely that the court simply erred in
its reasoning. The court continuously relied on the polygamy
cases to support its analysis and in effect failed to recognize the
Sherbert test. The court's reasoning, therefore, is highly suspect
and the issue presented is ripe for reevaluation.' 61
Another interesting case was presented to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia in United States v.
Kuch.' 6' The defendant had been indicted for obtaining and
transferring marijuana and also for the unlawful sale, delivery,
and possession of LSD. As a defense, the defendant alleged that
he was a member of the Neo-American Church and also occupied
154. 383 F.2d at 856.
155. Id. at 857.
156. Id. at 860.
157. Id. at 859.
158. Id. at 860.
159. The court did distinguish the holding in Woody on the grounds that peyote was a
central part of the religion in that case, and the religion in fact was organized.
160. Two subsequent Fifth Circuit opinions have expressly relied on Leary and
therefore have rejected freedom of religion defenses. See United States v. Spears, 443
F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972); and United States v. Hud-
son, 431 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1011 (1971).




the position of "primate of the Potomac" within that church.
Since the church advocated the use of psychedelic drugs, the de-
fendant claimed the statutes under which he was indicted violated
his right to the free exercise of religion. The court found the Neo-
American Church to be an interesting, though not a bona fide,
religion. In order to join the church a person had to subscribe to
the following tenet: "The psychedelic substances, such as LSD,
are the true Host of the church, not drugs. They are sacramental
foods, manifestations of the Grace of God, of the infinite imagi-
nation of the self, and therefore belong to everyone." ' 2 What
the court found to be interesting was the fact that the church's
motto was "Victory over Horseshit!"; its symbol was a three-
eyed toad; and its official hymns were "Puff, the Magic Dragon"
and "Row, Row, Row Your Boat.' '" 63 The court stated that "one
gains the inescapable impression that the membership is mocking
established institutions, playing with words and totally irreverent
in any sense of the term."' ' 6' The court went on to find the
aforementioned facts "helpful in declining to rule that the church
is a religion within the meaning of the First Amendment." 1 65 The
court also concluded that even if this were a religion, it would
present no defense to the prosecution. The court relied on Leary
in coming to this conclusion, but also found a "sufficiently im-
portant governmental interest" to justify the limitations placed
on first amendment freedoms.' 66 Though not applying the two-
stage analysis set forth in Sherbert, the court did recognize that to
justify any infringement on religion there must be some sort of
"substantial state interest."' 67 This recognition shows that the
court's reasoning does seem to be in line with that prescribed by
the Supreme Court.
In another federal district court case, Randall v. Wyrick,168 the
United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri
also found a compelling state interest to justify the state's limita-
tion of petitioner's religion. The petitioner sought a writ of
habeas corpus to gain relief from a state court conviction for
possession of marijuana, hashish, and LSD. The court assumed
162. Id. at 443.
163. Id. at 444-45.
164. Id. at 444.
165. Id. at 445.
166. Id. at 448.
167. Id. at 445.
168. 441 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
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that the petitioner's religion was valid and proceeded to apply the
standard used in Kuch. 1 9 In applying this standard the court
found that a compelling state interest did exist which justified the
infringement on religion. 170
Similar reasoning was applied by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Middleton. In that case, the de-
fendant had been convicted of importing marijuana. He testified
that he was a member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church and
that marijuana was an "indispensable" part of his religion., 7 On
appeal, the court assumed for the sake of argument that what the
defendant claimed was true and proceeded to find a compelling
interest on the part of the federal government that justified any
burden placed on defendant's religion. '7 The court distinguished
Yoder on the grounds that in that case there was no compelling
state interest.17 In finding the compelling interest in Middleton,
the court placed great weight on the fact that Congress had pre-
scribed severe penalties for the possession of marijuana. The pen-
alties were viewed as evidence of Congress' "grave concern" in
the matter,17 1 which led to the finding of a compelling interest.
The court's reasoning was circular, relying on the statute itself to
justify the infringement. As expressed earlier, this type of an
analysis is more in line with a rational basis test rather than a
strict scrutiny standard. In applying a strict scrutiny standard the
court must determine whether the interest itself is compelling,
rather than focusing on whether Congress thought it was compel-
ling. 17 6
Related Matters
There have been several decisions not directly involving, but
still affecting, the freedom of religion defense. In the Ninth Cir-
cuit case of Golden Eagle v. Johnson,7 1 the plaintiff was a
member of the Native American Church who had been arrested
and jailed for possession of peyote. Though he persistently told
169. Id. at 315.
170. Id. at 316.
171. 690 F.2d 820 (11th Cir. 1982).
172. Id. at 822.
173. Id. at 824.
174. Id. at 825.
175. Id.
176. The court obviously felt bound by the decision in Leary and therefore adjusted
its reasoning accordingly.
17-7. 493 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1005 (1975).
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authorities that he was constitutionally protected, they refused to
investigate the matter, and as a result he was incarcerated for
more than thirty days. Plaintiff then brought an action under sec-
tions 1981, 1982, and 1985 of title 42 of the United States Code
and sections 2201 and 2202 of title 28 of the Code, seeking in-
junction and monetary relief. Plaintiff claimed that some prear-
rest procedure was necessary "to reduce the 'chilling effect' of
the possibility of arrest on the free exercise of religion by a
member of the Native American Church."' 78 The court refused
to order such a prearrest procedure, finding that the ordinary
rules of criminal procedure were sufficient.' 79
The Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
has exempted from the Controlled Substances Act the use of
peyote by members of the Native American Church.' In Ken-
nedy v. Bureau of Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs,' the Church
of the Awakening sought review of an order of the Director of
the Bureau rejecting its petition to amend this exemption to in-
clude the Church of the Awakening.'8 2 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals agreed with the church and found the distinction
made between the Native American Church and all other reli-
gions to be arbitrary and capricious. However, the court also
found that a new classification including the Church of the
Awakening would be no better and would still be in violation of
substantive due process. For this reason the church's claim was
dismissed.'8 3 A similar complaint was filed in Native American
Church of New York v. United States.84 The petitioner in that
case was not affiliated with the Indians' Native American
Church, yet wished to be included in the exemption provided by
the federal government. The court agreed with this contention
and stated that "peyote is equally available to the plaintiff, the
Native American Church of New York, if in fact it is a bona fide
178. 493 F.2d at 1182.
179. Id. at 1184.
180. See 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1982).
181. 459 F.2d 415 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1115, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959
(1973).
182. 459 F.2d at 415-16.
183. The court also stated that "[t]he question of whether or not the religious use of
peyote by the members of any church is protected by the First Amendment is not properly
before us." Id. at 417. In a concurring opinion, Crocker, J., found that the "'police
power' will prevail over an individual's right to freely practice his religious beliefs where
the practice involves criminal conduct." Id.
184. 468 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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religious organization and would make use of peyote for sacra-
mental purposes and regard the drug as a duty."'8 5 The court re-
jected the claim by the petitioner that it be allowed to use pro-
scribed drugs other than peyote. "Congress can constitutionally
control the use, even for religious purposes, of drugs that it deter-
mines to be dangerous."' 6 The court seems to have been misled
by earlier federal court decisions which made this same conten-
tion. 17
Conclusion
The proper analysis to be applied in a freedom of religion case
consists basically of two inquiries: first, whether the government
has burdened a religious practice, and second, whether a compel-
ling state interest justifies the burden imposed.
The first inquiry to be made by the court can be broken down
into three parts, though each of these parts is very much inter-
related to the other two. The court must first ask itself whether a
"religion" actually exists. The burden to prove whether there is a
religion should properly rest on 'the defendant (as an affirmative
defense), and this question should be decided as a matter of law
by the court. Since the first amendment protects the free exercise
of "religion," whether a religion actually exists is a proper ques-
tion for the court to resolve rather than the trier of fact. 8 In ad-
dressing this question, the court should keep in mind that a reli-
gion need not be of a conventional nature,'89 and it need not pro-
fess any sort of belief in a supreme being. 9" Rather, religion argu-
ably can consist wholly of ethical and moral considerations.' 9 ' The
court should avoid delving into the religion itself, since it is not
185. Id. at 1251.
186. Id. at 1249.
187. For other cases that indirectly involve the freedom of religion defense and
psychedelic drugs, see Oliver v. Udall, 306 F.2d 819 (D.C. App. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 908 (1963) (court decided Indian Tribal Council not restricted by federal Constitu-
tion and therefore could ban peyote); Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272
F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959) (Indian Tribal Council not bound by federal Constitution);
Native Am. Church of Navajoland v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 392 F. Supp. 907 (D.
Ariz. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 901 (1972) (denial of certificate of incorporation does not in-
fringe on freedom of religion).
188. What "religion" is actually involves the defining of a term contained in the Con-
stitution and therefore should be decided as a matter of law.
189. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78.
190. Torcaso, 367 U.S. 488.




for the court to decide the validity or feasibility of what one
believes. 92 The focus of the inquiry should be prevention of the
use of religion as a "limitless excuse" for avoiding all prosecu-
tion,'93 resolving any and all doubts in favor of finding a religion.
Next, the court should simply look to the religion and the
statute in question, and then decide whether there is a burden of
some sort imposed upon the religion. All that need be answered
at this point is whether there is any burden imposed upon the
religion, the degree of the burden being unimportant at this stage
of the analysis. The determination should be an easy one to make
and once again should be decided by the court rather than the
trier of fact. ' All doubts should be resolved in favor of there be-
ing a burden imposed upon the religion.
The final part of this first inquiry basically encompasses the
"sincerity" test. The question is this: Accepting the religion to be
bona fide, does the defendant truly believe in what he professes?
This is a wholly subjective determination and, being a factual
question, should be determined by the trier of fact.'95
The second inquiry of the two-pronged analysis is whether a
compelling state interest justifies the burden placed upon the
religion. This stage of the analysis is only reached where the first
inquiry is answered in favor of the defendant,' 96 i.e., there is a
burden placed on defendant's religion. It is at this stage of the
analysis that the question of "centrality" and degree of burden
should come into play. The test applied is a balancing test,
weighing the interests of the state against the interests of the
defendant. The scales are weighted in favor of the defendant
192. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78.
193. TRIBE, supra note 2.
194. Whether there is a burden can be deduced basically from the language of the
statute. In a drug case it should prove relatively simple if the defendant professes a belief
in the drug, since government regulation of the drug obviously would "burden" this
belief. The balancing of the government interests with the degree of the burden takes
place in the second stage of the two-stage analysis.
195. This being the only factual determination to be made, it could be reserved for
trial with all other questions previously being answered by the court. Thus the court could
arguably assume that the defendant is sincere in his beliefs (saving such a question for
trial) and proceed to address the other parts of the two-stage analysis. If the rest of the
determination results in favor of the defendant, then the sincerity issue could be presented
to the trier of fact. This is not to say that the evidence of religious practices need be
presented at a different stage of the proceedings. Rather, the court can simply make its
findings before forcing the jury to determine the sincerity issue.
196. Note the discussion supra note 195. The order in which the questions are addressed
is merely a matter of logistics for the court to determine.
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because a religion is involved, and for the state to tilt the scales
back in its favor, it must demonstrate a compelling interest on its
part to infringe upon the religion. In a balance of interests,
whether defendant's drug use is a central or integral part of his
religion becomes a relevant consideration. The more central the
drug is to the religion, the greater the interest that must be
demonstrated by the state. In the same fashion, the less central
drug use is to the religion, the easier it should be for the state to
demonstrate an interest that would justify the burden placed
upon the religion. However, in any case the interest must prove
to be compelling. The only point of fluctuation should be exactly
where the compelling state interest overcomes the defendant's in-
terests in his religious practice. This balancing test is to be per-
formed by the court rather than by the trier of fact.
The foregoing analysis is basically that laid down by the
Supreme Court. It has been broken down into various parts in an
effort to make the analysis more systematic and easier to apply.
The main point to be recognized is that the freedom of religion
defense deserves careful consideration when raised and requires
the strictest level of scrutiny by the courts.
The freedom of religion defense has not met with much suc-
cess. The courts have not been overly receptive to the defense and
have applied various methods to avoid it. Some courts have ap-
plied the proper constitutional standards and have used sound
reasoning in rejecting the defense. Other courts have simply
avoided the proper constitutional guidelines developed by the
Supreme Court and instead have relied on questionable Supreme
Court decisions nearly a century old. Finally, there are those
courts that have applied the proper analysis, only to fall in the
reasoning used to arrive at their final results. Only the Native
American Church has been successful with the defense.
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